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EU-China Relations: Problems and Promises
♣ 
Jing Men
♦ 
 
EU-China relations have experienced some difficulties since 2005. Some scholars expressed deep 
concern about its future development.
1 This paper studies the shared and conflicting interests and 
concerns in EU-China relations and points out that the increasing degree of interdependence and 
the necessity of cooperation in strategic international affairs require the EU and China to build a 
long-term partnership. The examination of EU-China relations in this research indicates that it is 
for mutual benefit that the two sides need to maintain a stable and cooperative partnership. 
            Diplomatic relations between the EU and China started in 1975. After several decades of 
contact and cooperation, the establishment of a “Strategic Partnership” in 2003 brought the two 
much closer. Apart from economic complementarity, the two sides have explored many more 
areas of common interest. But the construction of the partnership is not without problems. From 
2005 till now, aparat from textile disputes, the failure of arms embargo lifting, growing trade 
deficit in its trade with China catches the attention of the Europeans and leads to rising political 
pressure in the EU to readjust its China policy, turning it to be more protective and tougher in 
dealing with Beijing. The troubled political relations exert more pressure on bilateral economic 
cooperation. Against such a background, the first High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue was 
held in Beijing in late April 2008. The dialogue participants work closely to find a breakthrough 
in bilateral cooperation to counterbalance the rising political pressure from Europe. Currently, 
EU-China relations are at a difficult historical period. It needs joint efforts and wisdom to deal 
with the thorny issues at hand and to make sure that these problems will not jeopardize bilateral 
relations in the long run.  
This  paper  will  have  a  close  look  at  some  issues  of  mutual  concern  to  find  out  the 
overlapping  and  conflicting  interests  between  the  EU  and  China.  Then,  it  will  examine  the 
promises and problems of the relationship. Such efforts aim to identify the commonalities and 
differences between the two sides and to point out why it is possible for a long-term partnership 
to be built between the EU and China.   
 
I.  Overlapping and conflicting interests between the EU and China 
 
Between the EU and China, there are both overlapping and conflicting interests. Both as rising 
powers, the necessity of cooperation and coordination in important international affairs of mutual 
concern serve as the basis of the strategic partnership. Economic cooperation allows the two to 
work together for material benefit, but differences in political regimes and value beliefs and 
calculation  of  relative  gains  give  rise  to  problems  in  bilateral  relations.  In  this  part,  an 
examination of three issues of mutual concern indicates that despite disagreements and problems, 
the EU and China are committed to building a long-term partnership.  
 
A.  Multilateralism/Multipolarity  
 
In the post-Cold War era, both the EU and China intend to play a greater role in international 
affairs, and both promote the formation of a political structure that facilitates the ascendance of 
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their political influence globally. In particular, the Chinese government has been getting closer to 
the position of the EU in advocating multilateralism in its external relations.  
In  the  first  EU-China  summit  in  1998,  the  Chinese  proposed  to  use  the  term 
“multipolarity”  in  the  final  joint  declaration.  The  British  representative  resisted  this  idea, 
probably being afraid that it would make the USA unhappy.
2 The EU prefers multilateralism to 
multipolarity. According to Benita Ferrero Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations, “For 
the EU,… it is not the number of poles which counts, but rather the basis on which they operate. 
Our vision is a world governed by rules created and monitored by multilateral institutions. And I 
know China shares this approach.”
3  
           The  EU’s  emphasis  on  multilateralism  has  been  clearly  illustrated  by  Javier  Solana’s 
report on European security strategy. He started by pointing out that “the end of the Cold War has 
left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is 
able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.” This offers a good opportunity for a rising 
Europe. According to him, “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global 
security and in building a better world.” Later in the report, he said that “international cooperation 
is  a  necessity.  We  need  to  pursue  our  objectives  both  through  multilateral  cooperation  in 
international organizations and through partnerships with key actors.”
4 
          China, although by no means hiding its craving for multipolarity, has quietly revised its 
view on the development of multipolarity in recent years. Before 2003, the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry held that multipolarity “helps weaken and curb hegemonism and power politics, serves 
to bring about a just and equitable order and contributes to world peace and development.”
5 
Without  mentioning  the  United  States  by  name,  China  made  it  clear  that  such  policy  of 
mulipolarity  was  intended  to  counterbalance  American  power:  At  present,  by  virtue  of  its 
economic,  technological  and  military  advantages,  an  individual    country  is  pursuing  a  new 
“gunboat  policy”  in  contravention  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  and  the  universally-
acknowledged principles governing international relations in an attempt to establish a monopolar 
world  under  its  guidance….  China  is  firmly  opposed  any  form  of  hegemonism  and  power 
politics.
6 
         The  interactions  with  the  outside  world  shape  China’s  understanding  of  international 
relations.  In  the  diplomatic  field,  China  has  changed  from  exclusively  relying  on  bilateral 
approach to an increasing reliance on multilateral approach, from suspicion of multilateralism to 
being gradually at ease with it. Such a change has also affected its interpretation of multipolarity. 
Since 2003, a new understanding of multipolarity by the Chinese government has appeared:  
      Our efforts to promote the development of the world towards multipolarization are 
not targeted at any particular country, nor are they aimed at re-staging the old play of 
contention  for  hegemony  in  history.  Rather,  these  efforts  are  made  to  boost  the 
democratization of international relations, help the various forces in the world, on the 
basis of equality and mutual benefit, enhance coordination and dialogue, refrain from 
confrontation and preserve jointly world peace, stability and development.
7 
 
While the term multipolarity is still used by the Chinese government, its implication has been 
quietly changing. In the new interpretation, the Chinese highlight the elements of multilateralism 
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such  as  democratization  of  international  relations  and  the  strengthening  of  coordination  and 
dialogue, which to a large degree has brought them closer to the EU’s understanding of the 
international relations. The Chinese are oriented more towards multilateralism in international 
politics in the 21
st century. Such changes help bring the Chinese and the Europeans closer in their 
understanding of international politics. 
 
B.  The Arms embargo issue 
 
Between the EU and China, a difficult issue is the arms embargo imposed in 1989 by the Western 
countries against China under the leadership of the United States. The lifting of arms embargo has 
been a topic for discussion in the EU since late 2003. The EU, led by France and Germany, 
agreed that a new code of conduct
8 regulating deliveries of European weapons to Beijing should 
be prepared to replace the arms embargo. The discussions between the leaders of the leading 
member states of the EU and China in 2004 seemed to lead to a sooner lifting. The European 
leaders gave an oral promise to the Chinese that this bilateral problem would probably be solved 
by June 2005.
9 However, what happened in the beginning of 2005 pushed the developments 
towards an opposite direction. The issue was made more difficult due to the interference of the 
US. Rather than being a bilateral issue, the arms embargo turns out to be an important concern for 
three parties. The EU faces a difficult situation due to pressure from the US and its commitment 
to  the  Chinese  on  the  ban-lifting.  Washington  urged  the  EU  to  maintain  the  embargo  and 
threatened to cut off American transfers of military technology to Europe. US Deputy Secretary 
of  State  Robert  Zoellick  warned  EU  officials  that  if  ever  “European  equipment  helped  kill 
American  men  and  women  in  conflict  that  would  not  be  good  for  the  (transatlantic) 
relationship.”
10  
After China passed an anti-secession law
11 in March 2005, the lifting of the embargo 
became more difficult. The EU does not want to see an increase in Cross-Strait instability and the 
risk of an arms race in the Taiwan Strait. Opposition in the EU to listing the ban was getting 
stronger. In April 2005, the European Parliament voted 431 to 85, with 31 abstentions, in favor of 
a resolution urging the EU to keep the weapons embargo.
12 As Eldar Subasic, Luxembourg’s 
Foreign Ministry spokesman admitted, “Looking at the positions that have been taken in different 
capitals, the chance of lifting the embargo by June now looks reduced.”
13  
Several years have passed. It is not clear when the embargo will be lifted. Nevertheless, 
there seems to be a tacit agreement between the EU and China that this issue is not allowed to 
disturb bilateral relations. Instead of accusing each other of misconduct, the two sides are very 
pragmatic and have removed the issue from the primary concerns of bilateral relations.  
 
C. Textile dispute 
 
The textile dispute in 2005 was the consequence of the abolishment of the 40-year-long quota 
regime and the rapid growth of Chinese exports to the European market.
14 The sharp rise in 
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Chinese textile exports to the EU in the first three months of 2005 led to vocal demands from 
about half of the 25 EU member states to impose immediate limits on Chinese textile imports.
15 
According to the statistics of Chinese Customs, Chinese textile exports to the EU-15 countries 
indicated a 78.4 percent increase compared to the same period of the previous year, its exports to 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium all increased by more than 80 percent.
16  
When  China  joined  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  in  2001,  the  admission 
agreement included a clause that allowed other WTO members to safeguard their own textile 
industries with measures including quotas if they face a sustained surge in Chinese imports that 
cause irrevocable harm to their own producers. Nevertheless, the accession agreement required 
that all the safeguard measures against Chinese textiles must be removed by the end of 2008.
17  
Facing a sharp increase of Chinese products in the European market, some of the member 
states, particularly the southern European countries, exerted pressure on the Commission to adopt 
emergency measures against the huge quantity of Chinese imports. Fearing that the dispute on 
textiles, in addition to the recent EU’s refusal to end its arms embargo on China, would have a 
negative impact on the partnership in general, Peter Mandelson, Trade Commissioner of the EU, 
took pains to leave the door open for negotiations and to avoid a confrontation with the Chinese.  
The  formal  negotiations  between  the  two  sides  reached  an  agreement  in  June  2005, 
introducing quotas on some of the categories of Chinese textile products. However, European 
importers took advantage of the month-long delay of the enforcement of the restrictions and 
placed huge orders in an attempt to get quota-free goods into Europe before the deadline arrived. 
The newly introduced quotas were rapidly exceeded. From July to September 2005, millions of 
Chinese garments piled up at EU ports awaiting a new round of negotiation between Brussels and 
Beijing. Agreement was finally reached in early September that year when the British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair held the rotating presidency of the EU.  
Despite many problems, the solution of the textile dispute convincingly demonstrated the 
sincerity  of  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  China.  Constructive  dialogues  and  pragmatic 
negotiations led to a good working relationship. Agreed by both sides, from the beginning of 
2008, the temporarily-introduced import restrictions by the EU have been replaced by a joint 
monitoring system. China works closely with the European Commission in export license and 
product surveillance in order to avoid repetition of the same situation of 2005. Now that several 
months have passed, it seems that this new system works well with joint efforts. 
 
Long-term partnership: promise and difficulties 
 
Between the EU and China, the direct motivation of cooperation comes from the expectations for 
economic benefit. Since economic reforms were carried out in China in 1978, two-way trade 
between the EU and China has been growing at an astonishing speed. By far, the EU is China’s 
largest trading partner, the largest high-tech exporter, and one of the largest investors. China is 
the EU’s second largest trading partner and the largest supplier. The degree of interdependence 
between the two sides is so high that the two have been tied closely together. Chinese economy 
would be in a great difficulty if the EU closed its market to Chinese products. The EU would 
suffer no less degree of damage economically if its trade with China were interrupted. 
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  The  opening  degree  of  the  EU  market  is  in  general  higher  than  that  of  the  Chinese 
market. Facing the stress of domestic development, the EU is eager to see that China is getting 
more open. This, as a matter of fact, conforms to the Chinese national interest. In the report of the 
17
th National Party Congress, Hu Jintao stated that “reform and opening up constitute the most 
salient feature of the new period.” Thanks to reform and opening up, “China is standing rock-firm 
in  the  East,  oriented  toward  modernization,  the  world  and  the  future….  Facts  have 
incontrovertibly proved that the decision to begin reform and opening up is vital to the destiny of 
contemporary China, that reform and opening up are the only way of …rejuvenating the Chinese 
nation.”
18 The report offers an important message to the world that China endorses the open door 
policy. The Europeans should be at ease that with the deepened reform, the opening degree of 
China will only be higher. In the short run, the EU and China may have differences concerning 
the  speed  and  scope  of  openness  of  Chinese  market,  but  this  should  not  damage  bilateral 
cooperation. Only by engaging in the construction of a long-term partnership can the two get the 
greatest benefits. 
While the EU and China share a long-term interest in pursuing prosperity and influence, 
the two sides diverge on how to reach such a goal. The divergence is due to the fact that the EU 
and  China  are  very  different  partners.  First  of  all,  they  come  from  different  ideological 
backgrounds. Such a difference is compounded by the fact that the EU and China are at different 
stages of development. The highly developed economy as a consequence of several hundred years 
of state building and capitalist development allows the EU to focus more on political freedom, 
and to attach great importance to civil rights of its citizens. In contrast, China has only become 
independent at the end of the 1940s and still targets at solving economic problems so that all the 
Chinese can have enough to eat and wear. As a result, China stresses more development rights of 
its citizens. This somehow fails the EU’s expectations. Proud of its own development path, the 
EU expects to exert influence on China and to turn it into a liberal democratic regime based on 
the rule of law. Yet, the contact with China seems to tell the Europeans that it is not that easy to 
transform this huge authoritarian system. The disappointment in China’s political development 
combines with the frustration of its trade deficit. Criticism on China’s slow pace of political 
reform, on its human rights record, on its lack of transparency in military expenditure, and on its 
restriction on market access dominate the media in Europe which in one way or another reveals 
the problems of bilateral relations.  
What makes bilateral cooperation more complicated is that different from China, the EU 
is composed of 27 member states and has a tendency of further enlargement. As a supranational 
regional organization, the EU has many different features from a sovereign state. For economic 
issues, the DG-Trade of the European Commission plays a leading role by working together with 
the Council and the European Parliament. In negotiations of economic and trade issues, DG-
Trade represents the whole Union. China knows to whom it talks to and with whom it needs to 
work out an agreement. But for political and military issues, the situation is more problematic. 
The arms embargo issue falls into the domain of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
that needs the approval of all the member states of the EU.
19 Each individual member state, no 
matter big or small, is important in the final decision of the Council of the European Union. 
Different member states may have different national interests and different political positions 
concerning their China policy. When the embargo was introduced in 1989, the Community had 
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only twelve members. Now with twenty-seven members, it will be an arduous task to achieve 
consensus on scrapping the ban among all of them. 
Another factor which has a strong impact on EU-China relations is the United States. 
Different from EU-China relations, EU-US relations is featured by common values, common 
cultural background, the same political regime and a long tradition of alliance. In comparison to 
the somehow “shallow” EU-China partnership, the EU-US partnership is more solid and stable. 
Discussion of lifting the arms embargo occurred mainly between 2004 and early 2005. Around 
that time, due to the damage that the Iraqi war did to transatlantic relations, the European side 
was eager to repair its relations with Washington and was unwilling to see that the ban lifting 
issue would upset the Americans. The role of the US reveals that EU-China relations are not at 
the same level as EU-US relations to the Europeans.  
 
  Concluding Remarks  
 
Since  2005,  the  partnership  has  been  encountering  increasing  difficulties.  The  arms  embargo 
imposed after the Tiananmen Square episode is still in place and the EU has a growing trade 
deficit with China. As a result, the initial enthusiasm about the partnership has been gradually 
replaced  by  disappointment.  Both  Brussels  and  Beijing  have  become  more  realistic.  While 
cautiously optimistic about the future of the partnership, both sides have come to recognize the 
existence of misunderstandings, disputes, and frictions. Three years after the strategic partnership 
had  been  established  with  China,  the  Commission  tried  to  summarize  the  developments  in 
bilateral relations in its sixth China policy paper in 2006. While confirming the rising influence of 
China, it emphasized the shared responsibility between China and the EU for maintaining global 
peace and stability. The EU repeated its engagement policy towards China and its commitment to 
support China’s transition towards an open society. Meanwhile, it also realized that “Europe 
needs to respond effectively to China’s renewed strength. To tackle the key challenges facing 
Europe today—including climate change, employment, migration, security—we need to leverage 
the potential of a dynamic relationship with China based on our values.”
20 
In  current  international  relations  among  big  powers,  economic  issues  have  largely 
replaced security and military issues and topped the agenda of national policy-making. A focus 
on economic growth and promotion of globalization in the post-Cold War era have noticeably 
enhanced  the  economic  interdependence  between  the  EU  and  China.  Trade  relations  and 
economic cooperation serve as the material basis for the EU-China partnership. Without dynamic 
bilateral trade and economic cooperation in the past ten years and more, bilateral relations would 
not have been as important as they are now. The comparative advantage each side possesses 
attracts  the  two  towards  more  business  and  cooperation,  but  the  growing  deficit  the  EU  has 
developed in its trade with China is a serious problem. If this problem is not addressed in a 
cautious way, the partnership may be damaged. 
The  EU  and  China  share  a  common  understanding  of  the  importance  of  maintaining 
international  peace  and  stability.  Such  understanding  constitutes  an  essential  part  of  the 
partnership. To gain an increasing influence in international affairs, each has found out that a 
multilateral  framework  is  better  than  unilateralism.  Nevertheless,  when  China  promotes  the 
multilateral  approach  internationally,  its  idea  is  to  counterbalance  American  dominance.  In 
contrast, the EU stays as a close ally of the US in the post-Cold War era. Despite the differences 
between  some  of  the  member  states  of  the  EU  and  the  US,  the  cooperative  nature  of  the 
transatlantic  relationship  will  not  change.  Between  the  EU  and  China,  both  have  become 
noticeably more independent in taking initiatives to strengthen their bilateral relations. However, 
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final, p. 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/docs/06-10-24_final_com.pdf    9   
the United States remains the external power which exerts a visible influence on Brussels-Beijing 
relations.  
As a result of the economic and political developments of each side and the changes in 
international relations, the two sides find both shared and conflicting interests on a wide range of 
issues. Such a partnership may not be exempted from difficulties and problems, but it conforms to 
their respective national interests to build a long-term partnership. The partnership should be 
maintained and developed for the sake of mutual benefits.  
 